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Abstract
A common critique to the Kyoto Protocol is that the reduction in emissions of CO2
by countries who comply with it will be (partly) offset by the increase in emissions
on the part of other countries (carbon leakage). This paper analyzes the effect of
technical change on carbon leakage in a two-country model where only one of the
countries enforces an exogenous cap on emissions. Climate policy induces changes
in relative prices, which cause carbon leakage through a terms-of-trade effect. Howe-
ver, these changes in relative prices in addition affect the incentives to innovate in
different sectors. We allow entrepreneurs to choose the sector for which they inno-
vate (directed technical change). This leads to a counterbalancing induced-technology
effect, which always reduces carbon leakage. We therefore conclude that the leakage
rates reported in the literature so far may be too high, as these estimates neglect the
effect of relative price changes on the incentives to innovate.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F18, O33, Q54, Q55.
Keywords: Climate Policy, Carbon Leakage, Directed Technical Change, International Tra-
de.
1 Introduction
An important threat to climate policy is that actions undertaken without universal par-
ticipation may prove to be ineffective: any partial agreement to reduce emissions, for
example of carbondioxide, will be undermined by the behaviour of countries outside the
agreement.1 Standard economic theory suggests that these countries may have several
incentives to increase their emissions. In the ﬁrst place, the relative price for carbon-
intensive goods could increase as global supply falls due to the emission constraint. This
gives countries outside the coalition incentives to expand their production of these goods
¤We are greatly indebted to Sjak Smulders, Emiliya Lazarova and Maurizio Zanardi for fruitful discus-
sions. In addition we would like to thank Erwin Bulte, Henk Folmer, Cees Withagen, Aart de Zeeuw and
conference participants in Z¨ urich, Bremen and Amsterdam for useful comments.
†Both authors: CentER and Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, P.O.
Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands. E-mail: c.dimaria@uvt.nl (corresponding author) and
E.H.vanderWerf@uvt.nl.
1Carbondioxide (CO2) is the greenhouse gas with the highest global warming contribution and most of
its anthropogenic emissions are directly related to fossil fuel use. Therefore most of the economics literature
on climate policy focuses on CO2. For simplicity, we also call the global pollutant in this paper carbon or
carbondioxide; our analysis, however, applies to any uniformly mixing transboundary pollutant.
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and export them to signatory countries (terms-of-trade effect). Secondly, a lower price for
fossil fuels, due to the reduced demand from the constrained economies, could induce
substitution towards this type of fuels in countries without a carbon constraint. Thirdly,
if damage costs from the global pollutant are strictly convex in global emissions, mar-
ginal environmental costs will decrease in unconstrained countries and emission levels
may be revised upwards. For all these reasons, emissions in unconstrained countries can
increase and off-set the reductions secured by the agreement participants, a phenomenon
known as carbon leakage.
In this paper we study the role of technical change in determining carbon leakage. As
discussed above, climate policy affects relative prices of both goods and factors, indu-
cing carbon leakage through what we called the terms-of-trade effect. However, these
relative price changes also affect the incentives to innovate in different sectors, causing a
counterbalancing induced-technology effect. As this effect is ignored in the existing litera-
ture on carbon leakage, the degrees of leakage that have been reported so far may be too
high, partly explaining the negative attitude of policy makers towards unilateral climate
policy.
Our aim in this paper is to isolate the effects of the regime of technical change on car-
bon leakage. To this end, we model two countries that are perfectly symmetric as refers
to preferences, technology and endowments. We only allow them to differ in one crucial
respect: one country imposes a binding emission cap, while the other remains uncon-
strained. We are thus able to compare the effects of an exogenous unilateral emission
constraint on the choice of pollution in the foreign country for two different regimes of
endogenous technical change. The ﬁrst regime reﬂects the ‘traditional’ way of modelling
technical change as increasing total factor productivity. We show that in this case carbon
leakage will occur through the terms-of-trade effect described above. However, climate
policy also changes the relative prices of inputs. This in turn will affect the relative proﬁ-
tability of innovating for the clean or dirty industry and hence the relative development
of technology in the two industries.2 Therefore, we model a second regime of technical
change, in which new inventions can be aimed at the industry that gives the highest pro-
ﬁts, and technical change may beneﬁt one of the productive factors more than the other
(directed technical change). We show that, in this case, the induced changes in the compo-
sition rather than in the level of technology always reduce carbon leakage relative to the
alternative scenario. Moreover, we hint at the possibility that, for high values of the pri-
ce elasticity of carbon-based energy, induced technical change leads to negative leakage
rates.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on carbon leakage by highlighting the
role of directed technical change in this framework.
The problem of carbon leakage has been widely studied in the context of the Kyoto
Protocal using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. These models generally
report leakage rates (the percentage of reduction in emissions that is offset by an increase
in emissions by countries outside the Protocol) ranging from 5% to 20% (see, for example,
the survey in Burniaux and Martins 2000), although some papers ﬁnd leakage rates as
high as 41% (Light, Kolstad, and Rutherford 2000). In a recent paper Babiker (2005) even
2Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins(1999)studythe effectofenergypricesand governmentregulationsonenergy-
efﬁciency innovation. They show that, for the products studied, changes in energy prices affect the direction
of innovation for some products and that they induce changes in the subset of technically feasible models
offered for sale. The authors conclude that ”the endogeneity of the direction or composition of technolo-
gical change is surely at least as signiﬁcant [as] the overall pace of technological change” (p. 971). Popp
(2002) shows that energy prices (including the effect of environmental policy) positively and quickly affect
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ﬁnds a leakage rate of 130% for one of his scenarios: in this case the Kyoto Protocol would
lead to an increase in global carbondioxide emissions. These differences in estimates
stem from differences in assumptions with respect to the degree of international market
integration, substitution and supply elasticities, and market structure. Although CGE
models do allow for both international and sectoral disaggregations, we feel that they
fall short of the mark, since they do not take into account the effects of climate policy on
technical change, and the feedbacks on emissions.
Another rich strand of literature addresses asymmetric international environmental
policy from a public economics point of view (e.g. Barrett 1994, Carraro and Siniscalco
1998, Hoel 1991). Stressing the roles of free-riding incentives and strategic behaviour
among nations, but abstracting from both technical change and international trade, this
literature concludes that emissions among countries are strategic substitutes and that
unilateral climate policy will lead to leakage of emissions.
Copeland and Taylor (2005) show, among other things, that in the presence of inter-
national trade and environmental preferences, a country’s response to a rest-of-world
emissions reduction is ambiguous. In their static two-good, two-factor, K-country model
without technical change, this result follows from allowing for income and substitution
effects on the consumption side to offset the terms-of-trade effect on the production si-
de. The mechanism underlying their result therefore differs from ours, both in terms of
modelling and in terms of economic content.
Golombek and Hoel (2004) study the effect of international spillovers of abatement
technology on leakage, using a static partial equilibrium two-country, one-good model
with transboundary pollution. In each country a central planner chooses research and
development (R&D) expenditures and abatement levels to minimize total costs that in-
clude environmental damages. Research activities lead, by assumption, to reductions in
abatement costs, while international technology spill-overs allow technology to diffuse
across borders at no cost. Hence, the authors effectively build in their model a mecha-
nism that counteracts the free-riding incentives underlined by previous literature. In our
model, on the other hand, the nature of technical change is endogenous, as it is itself
driven by proﬁt incentives, and depends on the characteristics of production.
The rest of the paper develops as follows. We introduce the model in section 2. In
section 3 we present equilibrium conditions for the four versions of our model: with
and without unilateral climate policy, and with and without directed technical change.
Section 4 contains the main results of the paper. We ﬁrst introduce the terms-of-trade
effect and study carbon leakage when entrepreneurs cannot aim new technologies to one
of the sectors; we then focus on carbon leakage under directed technical change and
show how the induced technology effect changes the results found before. We conclude
in section 5.
2 The Model
Our economy consists of two countries, c and u, that have identical production technolo-
gies and endowments, while only differing in their environmental policies.3 We assume
that country c (for constrained) imposes a binding cap on polluting emissions. We fo-
cus on a situation of free trade noting that, as long as the two countries do not differ in
environmental policies, there will be no actual scope for trade.
3In this paper we are only interested in the effect of climate policy on technology and in the ensuing
production choices. We therefore do not discuss growth rates or welfare. Since in addition we assume
balancedtrade, (intertemporal)preferencesplaynoroleandtheconsumptionsideofthemodelisredundant.CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 4
In each country, ﬁnal output Y is obtained as a CES aggregate of two (intermediate)













where r = c,u is the country index.4 We assume that good YE is produced using energy
(E) and a specialized set of differentiated machines. The range of types of machines avai-
lable to produce energy intensive goods is indicated by NE. Instead, YL is produced using
labour (LL) and a different set of machines, whose range is indicated by NL. Following

























where b 2 (0,1) and kr
j (i) is the amount of machines of type i employed in sector j = L,E
in country r. Both intermediate goods are traded internationally.
To produce each type of machines, producers need a blueprint invented by the R&D
sector, as will be discussed below. We assume that machines developed to complement
one factor of production cannot be usefully employed in the other sector and that blue-
prints can be traded internationally. Accordingly, NE and NL represent global levels of
technology and producers in each country can use all machine types globally available
for their sector. For a given state of technology, that is for given NE and NL, both (2)
and (3) exhibit constant returns to scale. However, when NE and NL grow due to R&D
activities the returns will be increasing at the aggregate level.5
We assume that in each country an amount of labour equal to L is inelastically sup-
plied at each point in time and that it is immobile across countries. Labour can either






E is the amount of labour in energy production in country r. As in Babiker (2005),
we assume that energy has to be produced using labour and some ﬁxed factor. Conse-




where f 2 (0,1). Energy generation causes emissions of carbondioxide. We assume that
CO2 emissions, Z, are proportional to the amount of energy produced, so that Z = E.
When country c introduces a binding constraint on the amount of carbondioxide emit-
ted, it de facto imposes a cap on the amount of labour allocated to energy production.
Indeed, when Zc is the maximum amount of emissions permitted at any point in time,
the allocation of labour in country c must satisfy Lc
E = (Zc)
1/f.
The last part of our model consists of the process of technical change. We consider
two alternative possibilities in this paper: technical change can either be ‘undirected’
4For simplicity, we set the share parameters in the CES to one, as they will only introduce an additional
constant term in the expressions.
5In other words, our model exhibits endogenous growth through variety expansion. See for example
Grossman and Helpman (1991).CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 5
or ‘directed’. With undirected or ’traditional’ technical change, prospective innovators
invest in the development of blueprints whenever it is proﬁtable to do so, yet they cannot
choose the sector they want to develop a new machine for. Instead, we assume that the
newly developed blueprint will be energy-complementing with probability g 2 (0,1)
and it will be labour-complementing with probability (1 ¡ g). As a consequence the
(expected) relative marginal productivity is constant, as is common in traditional (one-
sector) models of endogenous growth.6
Using a lab-equipment speciﬁcation for the process of technical change, we assume
that investing one unit of the ﬁnal good in R&D generates n new innovations.7 The total
number of innovations in this case will therefore develop according to:
˙ N = n(Rc + Ru), (6)
where Rr indicates total R&D investment by country r, and a dot on a variable represents
its time derivative, i.e. ˙ x = dx/dt.
The second regime of technical change that we consider is directed technical change.8
In this case prospective innovators, besides deciding upon the amount of their R&D out-
lays, are able to choose the sector they want to target their innovation efforts to. Hence
they will invent new machines for the sector that promises the highest returns. The de-
velopment of new types of machines takes place according to the following production
functions:9
˙ NE = n(Rc
E + Ru
E), (7)
˙ NL = n(Rc
L + Ru
L). (8)
A new blueprint must be developed before the innovator can sell it to producers, thus
the costs of R&D are sunk. As a consequence, machine producers must wield some mo-
nopoly power in the market for machines, in order to recoup the development costs. For
this we assume that an innovator is awarded a global patent for her invention and that
patents are perfectly enforced in both countries. As a result, each innovation will take
place only once and no international overlap in blueprints occurs.10
Furthermore, we simplify the analysis by assuming that machine production is local,
that is innovators license their blueprints to one producer in each region, so that blue-
prints are traded across countries, but machines are not.
3 The Equilibrium
In this section we derive the general equilibrium allocation of labour. We ﬁrst derive
a necessary condition for equilibrium on the goods and factor markets. For the model
6Hence, with undirected technical change the relative level of technology in the two sectors, NE/NL, is
exogenous and constant. Moreover, since NE/NL equals g/(1 ¡ g), any value of NE/NL can be calibrated
by an appropriate choice of the probability g.
7See Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
8The seminal work in this ﬁeld is due to Daron Acemoglu. See, for example, Acemoglu (2002).
9For simplicity we assume that R&D is equally productive in the two sectors. Relaxing this assumption
introduces a constant in the expressions that follow, but does not alter our qualitative results.
10Di Maria and Smulders (2004) also deal with directed technical change in an open-economy framework,
but develop a North-South model to explain pollution-haven effects. They focus on the asymmetry of in-
tellectual property rights’ protection: since patents are not protected in the South all innovation takes place
in the North. As a consequence the relevant market for innovators is the northern one, and the technology
developed is inadequate to the factor composition in the South. Hence, the level of emissions in the South
might increase once international trade in goods is allowed.CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 6
with undirected technical change, this condition gives the general equilibrium amount
of labour in energy production. For the model with directed technical change we need
to take another step and also study the equilibrium on the market for innovations. Joint
consideration of these two conditions will give the general equilibrium allocation under
directed technical change.
3.1 Equilibrium on the goods and factor markets
The market for the ﬁnal good is perfectly competitive and we choose the ﬁnal good’s
price as the numeraire. It follows that a necessary condition for the optimal demand
for labour- and energy-intensive goods is that the marginal product of each intermediate











where pj is the price of good Yj , j = E, L. Notice that we introduced a superscript d to
indicate demand and avoid confusion with supply in (2) and (3). Prices will be equalized
across the two regions since countries are either symmetric or trade at no cost.
Producers of the intermediate good Yj maximize proﬁts taking prices and technology
as given. In particular, they choose the amount of inputs taking as given the prices of
their output (pj), of the primary input they use (wj) and of the machines they use (pkj(i)
for a machine of type i complementing factor j), and the range of available machines Nj.11
Using (2) and (3) we can derive the local demand for a machine of type i in each sector















By the same token we can derive the (inverse) local demand for energy and labour from
























As mentioned before, the holder of a patent licenses production to only one producer
in each region. Consequently, local producers act as monopolists on their local market.
We assume that the production of machines in both sectors entails a constant marginal
cost equal to w units of the ﬁnal good, and that machines depreciate immediately after
use. Each monopolist maximizes her proﬁts subject to the appropriate demand function
in (10). As a result, each monopolistic producer will set her price as a constant mark-up
over marginal cost, that is pkj(i) = w/(1¡ b). Letting w = 1¡ b for convenience, we can
set the price of machines in both sectors equal to 1.12
11Throughoutthe paper wewill refertoenergy(E)and labourused in the productionof YL (LL)as primary
inputs, although in the model labour is the only ”truly” primary input.
12Notice that all machines are equally productive in intermediate goods production and entail the same
cost. Thus, the amount of each machine used in sectorial production will be the same, kj say. This symmetry
simpliﬁes the structure of the sectorial production functions as we may write:
R Nj
0 kj(i)(1¡b)di = Njk
(1¡b)
j ,
for j = E, L.CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 7
Using this result we obtain an expression for the relative supply of goods that depends
on relative prices, relative (primary) factors supplies and relative technology,
Yw = p(1¡b)/bSwN. (13)
In the remainder of the paper we deﬁne variables without a subscript as ratios, with the
convention that the variables at the numerator refer to the energy sector E. Hence, we
refer to N ´ NE/NL as the (global) technology ratio. Moreover, we let the global rela-
tive factor supply be Sw ´ (Ec + Eu)/(Lc
L + Lu
L), and deﬁne the world relative supply




L). Superscript w indicates that the
variable concerned represents a global (world) amount or ratio.
Equating relative supply (13) and relative demand (9) yields the market clearing relati-
ve price for intermediate goods, for given technology:
p = (NSw)
¡b/s , (14)
where we deﬁne s ´ 1 + (# ¡ 1)b. From (14) we see that a higher level of technology in
the sector for energy intensive goods, or a higher relative supply of energy decreases the
relative price of the dirty good.
We now turn to the market for factors. Substituting machine demands (10) into the
inverse demand functions for energy (11) and labour (12), we obtain an expression for
the relative factor rewards. Using this and the market clearing relative price for interme-
diate goods (14), we get the following expression for the relative factor rewards for given
technology:
w = N(s¡1)/s (Sw)
¡1/s . (15)
The relative price of energy decreases with energy supply, while the effect of the techno-
logy ratio N depends on whether s is larger or smaller than unity. Solving equation (15)
for Sw gives Sw = Ns¡1w¡s, which informs us that s is the elasticity of relative factor
demand with respect to their relative price. As will be discussed later, the effect of the
technology ratio on relative factor rewards depends on whether relative energy demand
is elastic or inelastic.13
To fully characterize the equilibrium on the goods and factor markets for given tech-
nology, we need to determine the way in which labour is allocated between production
of the labour intensive intermediate good and energy production. As noted in section
2, when country c faces a binding emission constraint, the amount of labour in energy
production is exogenously determined by the cap, Lc
E = (Zc)1/f. In an unconstrained
country however, each energy producer chooses the amount of labour so as to maximize
her proﬁts, subject to the production function in (5) and taking prices wL and wE as gi-
ven. This gives an unconstrained country’s demand for labour in energy production as a






Equating this expression and (15) we ﬁnd an expression representing the equilibrium
allocation of labour in country u, for a given technology ratio N and for given energy













E = 2L. (16)
13From the deﬁnition of s as 1 + (# ¡ 1)b, it is clear that s ? 1 , # ? 1. Thus relative factor demand is
elastic if and only if intermediate goods are gross substitutes in the production of the ﬁnal good, and inelastic
if and only if they are gross complements.CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 8
In this expression we allow for the possibility that each country chooses a different level
of labour in energy production. It is clear that, as long as no binding emission cap is intro-
duced, a symmetric expression holds for country c. In this case, given that countries are
identical, they will choose the same equilibrium amount of labour in energy production
so that we can rewrite the above expression, letting Lu
E = Lc
E = LE, as
f¡sN1¡sL
f(1¡s)+s
E + LE = L. (17)
Here LE is the amount of labour employed in energy production in each country, when
both countries are unconstrained.
In sum, when country c faces a binding emission constraint, its emissions, energy ge-
neration and amount of labour in energy producion are determined by the cap. Yet ex-
pression (16) still holds for the unconstrained country, u, and solves (implicitly) for the
amount of labour in energy production in the unconstrained region for given N.
As we saw in section 2 the technology ratio N is constant when technical change is
undirected. Consequently, in this case equations (16) and (17) determine the general
equilibrium allocation of labour. However, for the case of directed technical change we
need to study the equilibrium on the market for innovations to determine the general
equilibrium allocation of labour.
3.2 Equilibrium on the market for innovations
Under directed technical change innovators choose both the amount and the direction of
their innovation efforts. Quite naturally they will invest in the sector which is expected








At each point in time, then, the direction of innovation will be determined by relative
proﬁts: p = p1/bSw. This expression clearly shows that the entrepreneurs’ choice of the
sector to invest in is determined by the relative price of the intermediate goods (the price
effect) and by the relative amount of factors to which a machine type is complementary
(the market-size effect). In particular, for given technology, a decrease in energy supply
leads to a reduction in relative proﬁts through the market size effect and to an increa-
se through the price effect, see (14). Which of the two effects prevails depends on the
elasticity s, as will be discussed later.
Each potential innovator maximizes the net present value of the stream of future proﬁts
that she expects to enjoy over time. Along the balanced growth path of the economy,
proﬁts will not change over time,14 and, since entry is free in the R&D sector, we know
that the value of an innovation cannot exceed its cost (see (7) and (8)). Moreover, along
the balanced growth path both types of innovation must occur at the same time, leading
to the following no-arbitrage equation for the research sector:
pEn = pLn.
Substituting the appropriate expression for proﬁts from (18), this can be rearranged to
read,
p1/bSw = 1. (19)
14We deﬁne a balanced growth path as a situation in which prices are constant and NE and NL grow at the
same constant rate.CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 9
This no-arbitrage equation enables us to solve for the equilibrium level of the technology
ratio N. Indeed, using the expression for relative prices in (14), we may solve (19) for
N, obtaining the following expression for the balanced growth path equilibrium ratio of
technology levels in the two sectors:
N = (Sw)s¡1. (20)
From this expression we see that, as noted above, the effect of a decrease in energy supply
on the direction of technical change, that is on whether N increases or decreases, depends
on the size of s. When labour- and energy-intensive goods are gross complements in ﬁnal
goods production (s < 1), the price effect in (18) outweighs the market size effect and
a decrease in energy supply induces an increase in the range of energy complementary
machines. However, when s > 1 the result is reversed and the reduction in energy
supply induces an increase in the range of labour-complementary machines.
3.3 General equilibrium under directed technical change
In the previous sections we have derived equilibrium conditions for the goods and fac-
tor markets and for the market for innovations. We are now ready to derive the general
equilibrium allocation of labour for the model with directed technical change, as it ob-
tains when both markets are in equilibrium at the same time.15














E = 2L. (21)
Interpreting Lc
E as the constrained level of labour used in energy generation in country
c following the introduction of an emissions cap, this expression solves for Lu
E in the
unconstrained country under directed technical change.
Alternatively, assuming that no environmental policy is in place, we can interpret
(21) as one of the two (symmetric) expressions that determine the equilibrium level of
Lc
E = Lu
E = LE under directed technical change. Substituting LE for the country speciﬁc
variables yields the following expression:
f1/(s¡2)L
(f(s¡1)¡1)/(s¡2)
E + LE = L. (22)
The above equations summarize the long-run equilibrium of our model with and wit-
hout unilateral climate policy, under directed technical change. Indeed, they solve impli-
citly for the optimal level of Lu
E (LE, respectively), from which we can immediately derive
all the other variables of the model.
4 Unilateral climate policy and carbon leakage
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of unilateral climate policy, in terms of carbon
leakage, across different regimes of technical change. To compare different scenarios, we
15It is possible to show that the model has an interior stable equilibrium for s 2 (0,(1 + f)/f). The
stability of the equilibrium requires that in the (LE, N) plane the line depicting the goods market equilibrium
(16) is steeper than the no-arbitrage equation (20), at the point of intersection. The details of the existence
and stability discussion are available from the authors upon request.CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 10
needtostartfromacommonbaseline. Thenaturalbaselinetochooseisthelong-runequi-
librium of the model with directed technical change when both countries are unconstrai-
ned, equation (17). This baseline is characterized by the (symmetric) equilibrium level of
labour devoted to energy generation LE and by the corresponding (endogenous) techno-
logy ratio N. In order to have comparable baselines across technology regimes, we need
to choose g, the probability for an innovator to end up with an energy-complementing
blueprint, such that g/(1 ¡ g) = N equals the level prevailing under directed technical
change, see Section 2.
Starting from this common equilibrium, we introduce an emissions constraint in one
of the countries and study the degree of carbon leakage that occurs along the balanced
growth path. We ﬁrst study carbon leakage when technical change is undirected. Then
we move on to the model with directed technical change and discuss how and why the
results from this model differ from the model with ’traditional’ endogenous growth.
4.1 Carbon Leakage under undirected technical change
Carbon leakage occurs when the unconstrained region increases its emissions in reaction
to a reduction in emissions by the other country (i.e. when Lu
E > LE). Intuitively it would
seem clear that there should always be some carbon leakage: when a country exogenous-
ly reduces its supply of energy by introducing a limit to the amount of emissions, the
energy intensive good becomes scarcer on its domestic market, giving rise to an increase
in its relative price. This creates some scope for trade: the unconstrained economy now
enjoys a comparative advantage in the production of the dirty good and will expand its
production thereof. As a consequence Lu
E and hence emissions Zu increase. We call this
the terms-of-trade effect of a unilateral emission constraint. This result indeed holds in the
case of undirected technical change, as formalized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When technical change is undirected, carbon leakage will always be positive along
the balanced growth path.
























E · LE. Then the right hand side is larger than or equal to one while the
left hand side is smaller than one. So we have a contradiction, hence Lu
E > LE.
We illustrate this result in Figure 1, where the dark dashed line represents emissions
(or equivalently energy production) in each country when both are unconstrained. The
amount of emissions by the unconstrained country when the other country faces a bin-
ding emission constraint, under undirected technical change is represented by the solid
black line.16 The ﬁgure clearly shows that emissions in the unconstrained region always
increase following the introduction of the cap. In addition, we see that the amount of
energy produced in the unconstrained region is declining with s, the elasticity of rela-
tive demand for energy with respect to its relative price. The higher this elasticity, the
16The ﬁgures in this paper are obtained from numerical simulations, using as baseline parameters values:
L = 1, f = 0.4, and s 2 (0, 3.5). For each value of s the corresponding value for N for the model with
directed technical change were computed and the appropriate g calibrated such that both models start from
the same baseline. We conducted numerous robustness checks for the local results derived in Propositions
2 and 4. In all cases the qualitative results were unchanged. For the sake of graphical clarity, the graphs are
plotted over a smaller range for s.CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 11
lower the demand for energy in the constrained economy following the imposition of the
constraint, hence the lower the export-led increase in energy generation.
 
1     2    
s    
Z    
Z     Z 
u   UTC     Z 
u   DTC    
Figure 1: Emissions in the unconstrained model (Z), in the constrained model under undirected
technical change (ZuUTC), and under directed technical change (ZuDTC)
When technical change is endogenous but undirected, unilateral climate policy is un-
dermined by emission increases by unconstrained countries. However, it seems intui-
tively clear that changes in relative prices cœteris paribus will not lead to an increase in
global emissions. Climate policy will shift production to the unconstrained country (pro-
position 1), but the increase in the relative price of the carbon intensive good will at the
same time lead to a reduction in global energy demand. To address this formally, we
use a log-linearized version of our model, which we derive in Appendix A, to obtain the
following result:
Proposition 2. When technical change is undirected, global emissions will always decrease fol-
lowing a marginal tightening of the emission constraint.
Proof. In section A.2 of the Appendix, we show that we can write a change in global
energy production (emissions) f Ew as:
f Ew =






(1¡ f)s + hf + c
f Lc
E. (23)
The denominator and the ﬁrst term in the numerator are positive. Moreover, from Pro-
position 1 and the deﬁnition of a binding cap we have Lu
E > LE > Lc
E. It follows that also
the second term at the numerator is positive. Hence f Ew/f Lc
E > 0.CARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 12
Although this proposition refers to the linearized version of the model, our numerical
simulations suggest that the results also hold for the non-linearized model, as illustrated
in Figure 2. Here we present the leakage rate, deﬁned as the ratio of the induced increase













, as a function of s. The leakage rate for the
case of undirected technical change is represented by the dark line. As the ﬁgure shows,
the leakage rate is always positive, but less than 1.
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Figure 2: Leakage rate under undirected (UTC) and directed (DTC) technical change
4.2 Carbon leakage under directed technical change
In this section we focus on the central point of our analysis and derive our main results
comparing the effects of an emission cap across regimes of technical change. We start by
noting that allowing for directed technical change effectively provides the economy with
an additional instrument to cope with the consequences of the introduction of a binding
cap in the constrained country. Changes in the composition of technology may enable the
unconstrained country to meet the increased demand for energy intensive goods while
diverting less labour from its relatively more productive use in the YL sector. This is what
we call the induced-technology effect of a unilateral emission constraint. We will show that
this effect has the opposite sign to the terms-of-trade effect introduced above and hence
tends to reduce carbon leakage.
We can compare the two versions of the model using the Le Chatelier principle (see
e.g. Silberberg 1990). Taking the total differential of (16) and rearranging we can write
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where DTC indicates directed technical change and UTC undirected technical change.
We can interpret this expression as saying that the overall effect of the cap when allowing
for directed technical change (the left hand side) can be decomposed in a terms-of-trade
effect, represented by the ﬁrst term at the right-hand side, and a induced-technology effect,
the remaining term. Whether these two effects act in the same direction or not ultimately
determines under which regime we can expect leakage to be higher. In order to draw any
conclusion, we need to sign the components of the above equation.
We know from Proposition 1 that the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is always negati-
ve. For the second term, let us consider ﬁrst the case where s < 1. From (20) we see that
dN/dLc
E < 0. On the other hand, from (16) it is clear that when N (and hence N1¡s) in-
creases, Lu
E must decline to satisfy the equation, cœteris paribus. Thus, ¶Lu
E/¶N < 0. This
shows that the last term at the right-hand side of (24) is positive for s < 1. A symmetric
argument holds when the relative energy demand is elastic, i.e. when s > 1. In this case
both derivatives are positive, and so is their product.
To complete our discussion, notice that when s equals unity N is independent of Sw
and always equal to 1. Equation (20) shows that in this case the technology levels NE
and NL are the same in the long-run equilibrium across regimes of technical change. As
a consequence expressions (16) and (21) in this case coincide and there is no difference
between the models with directed and undirected technical change. This is due to the
fact that when s = 1, our CES speciﬁcation in (1) reduces to a Cobb-Douglas production
function, in which case technical change will always be neutral to the inputs concerned.17
We summarize this discussion in the following result:
Proposition 3. For s 6= 1 carbon leakage will be smaller with directed technical change than
with undirected technical change. For s = 1 it will be identical across regimes.
Proof. In text.
With this result we have shown that the induced-technology effect works against the
standard terms-of-trade effect, and lowers the amount of carbon leakage that would oc-
cur when technical change is not directed. Figure 1 shows the two effects. The pure
terms-of-trade effect can be read from the upwards shift of emissions from the dashed
dark line (the model without a cap) to the dark solid line (the model with a cap and un-
directed technical change). The induced technology effect is summarized by the move
from the solid black line to the light gray one (the model with a cap and directed techni-
cal change). Indeed, the amount of emissions is lower when technical change is directed,
with the exception of the case of Cobb-Douglas technology.
Another interesting question is whether the induced-technology effect can more than
offset the terms-of-trade effect and lead to a situation where carbon leakage is negative.
Figure 1 shows that an afﬁrmative answer is in order. Indeed, the curve representing
emissions under directed technical change (the light curve) dips below the graph of the
baseline case (the dashed curve), as s gets larger. The following proposition makes it
formal:18
Proposition 4. When technical change is directed, carbon leakage due to a marginal tightening
of the emission constraint will be positive for s < 2, zero for s = 2, and negative for s > 2.
17Notice that, formally, we would need share parameters summing up to one in (1) to obtain a constant-
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function as # (and hence s) goes to 1.
18Although this proposition represents a local result, all our simulations conﬁrm this pattern for the model
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Proof. In section A.3 of the Appendix we use the log-linearized model to show that,














(2¡ s)(hf + c) + 1¡ f
. (25)
As discussed in the Appendix, a necessary condition for a stable equilibrium is that the
term at the denominator is positive. Moreover, the second term in parenthesis at the
numerator is always positive. Hence, around a stable equilibrium, we have f Lu
E/f Lc
E R 0
whenever s R 2.
This proposition says that, when technical change is directed, the induced-technology
effect can outweigh the terms-of-trade effect, provided that the relative demand for ener-
gy is sufﬁciently elastic. Whether s larger than two is a plausible case is a difﬁcult issue
to assess. In our model energy, E, implicitly stands for energy generated from fossil fuels
rather than energy tout-court, as its generation directly causes the emissions of carbondi-
oxide. It is safe to assume that the price elasticity of carbon-based energy is higher than
the price elasticity of energy per se, as it is easier to substitute from fossil to non-fossil
fuels, than from energy to other inputs. Thus, the demand elasticity of energy intensive
goods may be quite high in our model. However, its exact value, and hence the plausibi-
lity of the negative leakage result, remains an open empirical question.
The results in propositions 3 and 4 are driven by two mechanisms. To analyze these
mechanisms we ﬁrst show how the composition of technology is affected by the intro-
duction of the cap. Successively we address the interaction between changes in N, the
level of s, and relative factor productivity, to understand the labour allocation decision
in the unconstrained country.
The composition of technology evolves according to the relative proﬁtability of R&D
in the different sectors. As noted in section 3.2, the ﬁnal effect of introducing a cap (i.e. a
change in Sw) on relative proﬁts will depend on both the change in the relative market si-
ze and the change in relative prices. Climate policy reduces the amount of energy produ-
ced and hence decreases the potential size of the market for new energy-complementing
innovations. At the same time, it makes energy scarcer, thereby rising the price of energy
and making an innovation for the energy intensive good more valuable. Whether the ne-
gative market size effect or the positive price effect dominates depends on s, the elasticity
of the relative demand for energy with respect to its relative price. Since in the long-run
equilibrium the technology ratio is given by (20), we see that whenever s < 1 the price
effect dominates and the introduction of a cap will induce an increase in N. When s > 1
on the other hand, the market size effect dominates and N decreases. This yields a rela-
tion between N and s such as the one plotted in Figure 3, where the gray line represents
the ratio of technology under directed technical change and the dark one depicts the case
of undirected technical change.
Recalling from (15) that relative factor productivity for the constrained model can be
written as,
w = N(s¡1)/s(Sw)¡1/s,
we clearly see that, for given N, the effect of the cap is to unambiguously increase the
relative productivity of energy since it initially becomes scarcer on the global market, and
thus to increase pollution in the unconstrained country. Consequently, leakage is always
positive when the technology ratio is given. Once we allow N to change in response to
economic incentives, some form of induced energy-saving technical change occurs. TheCARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 15
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Figure 3: Technology ratios (N) under undirected and directed technical change
expression above shows how the effect of a change in the technology ratio on relative
factor productivity depends on s. Indeed, when s < 1, N is higher than in the case of
undirected technical change (see Figure 3). In this case N(s¡1)/s is lower, and the increase
in relative productivity induced by the cap is counteracted by the change in technology.
The same result can be obtained for s > 1, in which case both N and N(s¡1)/s are below
their baseline levels. As a result the induced change in technology (N(s¡1)/s) mitigates
the terms-of-trade effect (which works through (Sw)
¡1/s). Taking into account the effect
that changes in relative prices, induced by the introduction of unilateral climate policy,
have on the incentives to innovate for the energy-intensive or labour-intensive industries
hence unambiguously leads to lower leakage rates.
To determine which of the two effects will be stronger, we substitute (20) in (15) to
obtain the general equilibrium relative factor productivity:
w = (Sw)s¡2.
Evidently, as long as s < 2 the decrease in the factor ratio induced by the cap will lead to
an increase in the relative productivity of energy and leakage will be positive (but lower
than under undirected technical change). When s > 2 instead, the decrease in Sw will
reduce the relative productivity of energy. The change in the technology ratio is so strong
that it will more than compensate for the terms-of-trade effect, and the unconstrained
country will voluntarily decrease its emissions.
5 Concluding remarks
The refusal of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is seen by many as a se-
rious threat to the Protocol’s effectiveness. If a coalition of technologically advancedCARBON LEAKAGE REVISITED 16
(and hence fossil-fuel dependent) economies decides to voluntarily reduce its emissions
of carbondioxide, this will increase the price of dirty goods within this coalition. Hence,
unconstrained countries, such as the US, might beneﬁt from increasing their production
of dirty goods and exporting them to coalition members, thereby offsetting the decrease
in emissions by the ratifying countries (carbon leakage).
Since environmental policy affects relative prices and hence relative proﬁtability of in-
venting for the clean or dirty goods industry, however, the effects of the direction of tech-
nical change on carbon leakage cannot be ignored. In this paper we studied the effects of
directed technical change on carbon leakage when a technologically advanced country is
outside the coalition.
To shed light on this issue we have compared the results of a model where technology
levels in the clean and dirty goods sector are allowed to develop differently (directed
technical change) with those derived from a model of ‘traditional’ endogenous technical
change. We have shown that taking into account the effects of relative price changes on
the incentives to innovate always leads to lower leakage rates than when this induced
technology effect is ignored. We have also discussed the possibility that the direction
of carbon leakage can be reversed. When the elasticity of the demand for carbon-based
energy is sufﬁciently high, the change in technology due to the emission constraint is
such that it becomes optimal for the unconstrained country to cut back on its emissions.
Whetherthislattersituationconstitutesaplausiblescenarioremainsamatterofempirical
investigation.
The advocates of the Kyoto Protocol and other forms of unilateral climate policy may
ﬁnd some support in our results: our result shows that, given that the applied literatu-
re on carbon leakage abstracts from the direction of technical change, the leakage rates
proposed in the current debate might prove to be overestimated. As a consequence, uni-
lateral climate policy might turn out to be more effective than generally considered.
Ratifying countries, in particular, might be relieved by our conclusions. Indeed, their
efforts to reduce polluting emissions will be undone by the reactions of others to a les-
ser extent than often suggested. Moreover, we also hint at the (theoretical) possibility
that when the demand for carbon-based energy is sufﬁciently elastic, the ratiﬁers’ efforts
could even be compounded by the emissions reduction undertaken by the unconstrained
countries and global emissions could decrease.
The degree to which the mechanisms highlighted here can change current estimates
of carbon leakage depends on the elasticities of the model. Our theoretical conclusions
need to be assessed through quantitative methods, ﬁrst and foremost using CGE models
that incorporate directed technical change, and therefore sector-speciﬁc data on technical
progress. Building such a model, and ﬁnding the necessary data, however, constitutes a
formidable challenge for future research.
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A Appendix: the log-linearized model
In this appendix we (log-)linearize the model around the steady state and derive several
results.
A.1 Deriving the log-linearized model
The linearized version of the goods market equilibrium condition (16) reads:
(s ¡ 1) e N = [(1¡ f)s + hf + c] f Lu
E +
·
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where a tilde, e , over a variable denotes a small percentage change, and where we have
















The percentage changes in Lu
E and Lc
E denote any marginal change in the respective va-
riable. For example, a decrease in Lc
E (that is a f Lc
E < 0) from Lc
E = LE would represent
the introduction of a marginal emissions cap in the country, while a decrease from any
Lc
E < LE would represent any marginal tightening of an existing cap.
When we linearize the equilibrium condition for the market for innovations, (20), we
ﬁnd:
e N = (s ¡ 1)
µ







E + (s ¡ 1)(hf + c) f Lu
E. (A.3)
A.2 Appendix to Proposition 2





and differentiating yields the following representation in growth rates: f Ew = hff Lu
E +
(1¡ h)ff Lc
E < 0, where we have used the deﬁnition of h from (A.2).
From (A.1), setting e N = 0 due to the undirectedness of technical change, we can solve
for Lu
E. Using this to substitute in the expression for the change in total emissions above











(1¡ f)s + hf + c
. (A.4)
A.3 Appendix to Proposition 4














(2¡ s)(hf + c) + 1¡ f
. (A.5)
The denominator of this expression will be positive around any stable equilibrium. In-
deed, the dynamics of the system require that at any stable equilibirum the slope of the
goods market equilibrium condition be steeper than the R&D equilibrium condition in
the (LE, N) space. The relevant slopes can be easily derived from (A.1) and (A.3). For

















= (s ¡ 1)(hf + c),
where the subscripts GME and R&DE indicate the goods markets and the R&D market
equilibrium conditions, respectively. The sign of the inequality is reversed for the case
when s > 1. Sinceinbothcasesonecaneasilyverifythatthestabilityconditionsimpliﬁes
to
(2¡ s)(hf + c) + 1¡ f > 0,
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